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charitable institutions total immunity from tort liability

has long since lost its force, that an imposition of liability,
at least where there is liability insurance, would not place
an undue burden on such institutions. Such an approach
is certainly in accord with a very strong and highly acceptable national trend.26 A most effective arrangement would
be the repeal and re-enactment of Section 82 to provide
simply that any insured charitable institution is liable for
its torts, or the torts of its agents in the course of employment, to the extent of the amount of its insurance coverage. 21 If this is done a great deal of litigation will become
unnecessary and a complex problem will be ended after
more than nine years of doubt and question. Or, it might be
desirable that the legislature should consider adoption of
the later view of the English courts and many American
jurisdictions that charitable institutions may be held responsible in tort (without regard to whether or not they
carry insurance against such liability).
CARL

A. D.mKEE

Bidder's Right To Return Of Deposit From City After
Bidder's Refusal To Enter Into Written Contract
Because Of A Material Mistake In The Bid
Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Co.1
Plaintiff, DeLuca-Davis Construction Co., Inc., submitted a bid for certain construction work to be done for
the city of Baltimore. In accordance with Section 38 of
the Baltimore City Charter it submitted with its bid a
certified check for $50,000. After all the bids were opened
and announced by the Board of Estimates, plaintiff realized
that it had made a mistake, and it so notified the municipal
authorities before they had taken any action on the bids.
Plaintiff, at the trial, showed that it had made a clerical
error in transferring one particular estimated cost item
from its "detailed work sheet" to the "summary work
sheet". (Cost of unclassified excavation was erroneously
set down as $3.34 per yard instead of $13.34 per yard.)
'Supra, ns. 13, 14.
"It might be desirable for the Legislature to provide a direct action
against the insurer, as some states have done, either in a separate action
or by way of Joinder. See ARx. STAT. ANN. (Off. ed., 1947), Sec. 66-517
construed in Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 92 F. Supp. 140
(W. D. Ark., 1950).
'210 Md. 518, 124 A. 2d 557 (1956).
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This mistake resulted in the bid being about $600,000 lower
than it would otherwise have been. The bid submitted was
$1,796,064.25. Plaintiff asked that it be allowed to correct
its bid or that the bid be withdrawn and the deposited
check be returned. The City refused these requests, contending that the aforementioned section of the Baltimore
City Charter required them to refuse. That section provides that:
"Bids when filed shall be irrevocable.... To all such
bids there shall be attached a certified check of the
bidder.., and the bidder who has the contract awarded
to him, and who fails to execute promptly and properly the required contract and bond shall forfeit said
check. The said check shall be taken and considered as
liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, for failure of
said bidder to execute said contract and bond. Upon
the execution of said contract and bond by the successful bidder, the said check will be returned to him."
Plaintiff asked relief in equity and the Circuit Court of
Baltimore City granted reformation of his bid. On appeal,
held reversed, that plaintiff was entitled to a rescission of
his bid, not reformation, and that he was entitled to the
return of his deposit.
There are two main subject areas of interest in this case.
The first one is the Court's decision to grant relief to the
bidder notwithstanding the provisions of Section 38 of the
Baltimore City Charter. The second concerns the Court's
choice of the form of relief to be granted, i.e., rescission
instead of reformation.
Willson v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore2
concerned the plight of a bidder whose bid was accepted
but couldn't enter into the written contract because he was
unable to find a surety as was required as a condition
precedent to entering into the contract. There was no
relevant statute at the time (1896), but the wording on the
bidding form required a certified check to accompany each
bid and stated, "if the successful bidders enter into contract with bond without delay, their checks will be returned to them as will those of the unsuccessful bidders".3
The bidder sued at law for the return of his deposit. The
Court ruled that he was entitled to recover it. It observed
that there was no provision expressly requiring that the
check be forfeited in case of failure to enter into the con283

Md. 203, 34 A. 774 (1896).
8 Ibid, 209.
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tract, that retention of the deposit was nowhere described
as liquidated damages, and that the tendency of the courts
was to regard such provisions as in the nature of penalties
and therefore as limiting the City to the retention of an
amount that was equal to the actual damages sustained by
the breach.4 The City suffered no actual damages, since it
re-advertised for bids and obtained and accepted one that
was lower than plaintiff's. It should be noted that in this
case the Court showed a strong disinclination to allow a forfeiture even though the bidder had no legally justifiable
reason for failure to enter into the contract.
In the interim period between this case and the next one,
a provision was added to the Baltimore City Charter, identical in every important respect to the present provisions
of Section 38 of the Baltimore City Charter.5 This legislation expressly required a forfeiture of the whole check in
case of failure to enter into a written contract, and the forfeiture was stated to be liquidated damages and not a
penalty. It also made all bids irrevocable.
In 1914, in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v.
Robinson Construction Company,6 a bidder who had made
a clerical error in compiling the amount of his bid and who
refused to enter into the contract that was awarded to him
by the City, sued at law for the return of his deposit. The
newly operative statutory provisions were held to bar recovery of the deposit.7 There appears in the opinion, how'Ibid, 212 et 8eq. The Court said:
"Now, it will :be observed that the contract between the appellant
and the appellee, evidenced by the bid filed and accepted, has not a
word in it descriptive of the five hundred-dollar deposit as either
liquidated damages or a penalty. It is clear, therefore, that the parties
themselves have not by any term or provision of the agreement declared
that the deposit shall be one or the other .... and it is equally clear
that there is nothing in the subject-matter of the agreement which
imperatively requires that the deposit be characterized as liquidated
damages, especially as the decided inclination of the Courts in doubtful
cases even is to treat the stipulated sum as merely a penalty. Indeed
there is no explicit forfeiture of the deposit at all. . . . though it is
palpably implied thast so much of it as will be a just compensation for
any loss that may result to the city . . . was, . . . designed by the
parties to be applied by the city to its reimbursement."
'Sec. 15 of the Baltimore City Charter as amended by Chapter 163 of the
Acts of 1908, p. 589.
'123 Md. 660,91 A. 682 (1914).
Ibtd, 663. The Court asks:
"In the face of these provisions can a bidder refusing to execute a
contract awarded to him . . . force the return of his deposit? Or once
having filed his proposal, can he withdraw it before the bid Is accepted
and recover his deposit?
"It will be noticed that, in plain terms, the section directs that the
bidder shall deposit a certified check to indemnify the city In case he,
as the successful bidder, fails to execute the contract and furnish the
bond; that bids when filed are irrevocable; . . . It certainly must be
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ever, a faint intimation of the possibility of a different
result had the action been brought in equity.'
The instant case was brought in equity and, as we have
seen, the bid was rescinded and the deposit returned. This
brings us to the vital question: How did the Court dispose
of the statutory provisions of Section 38 which so effectively barred its predecessor in the Robinson case from
granting relief at law? The court approached the problem
first by citing the leading case of Moffett, Hodgins and
Clarke Co. v. Rochester9 as holding that under the similar
circumstances of that case, "the bid was that of the bidder
only in form but in actuality was no bid at all".10 This is
an accurate statement of the "no real bid" rationale which
the Supreme Court adopted to explain why the statutory
provisions relating to irrevocability of bids and forfeiture
of deposits were not operative in that case." The Maryland
Court also cited a Washington case 2 as holding that equity
would relieve from a statutory forfeiture in the same manner as one provided by ordinary contract.'
The Court in the instant case further relied heavily on
State of Connecticut v. F. H. McGraw & Co. 4 quoting the
following statement:
that there was the intention that these explicit directions should have
some force and meaning. We must ascribe a reasonable construction to

them or we render the statute a mere nullity."
On page 666, the Court continues:
"This may seem a hardship upon a bidder who has actually made a
mistake, but If the statute Is -to have any effect that must be the result.
The statute is an essential part of the proposal and the bidder makes
all Its terms and conditions an obligation upon himself by submitting
a bid."
"The last paragraph of the opinion is as follows:
"The case of Moffett v. Rochester, 178 U. S. 373, relied upon by the
appellee, was upon a bill in equity for a reformation of the proposal
and therefore is not authority for the form of action in this case. In
fact, all of the cases, cited by the appellee, are cases in equity and In
the most of them there was no statute involved." Ibid, 666.
'178 U. S.373 (1900).
10Supra, n. 1, 530.
n Supra, n. 9, 386. The Supreme Court quotes with approval the circuit
court opinion:
"... but as was said by the learned Circuit Court:
'The complainant is not endeavoring to withdraw or cancel a bid or
bond. The bill proceeds upon the theory that the bid upon which the
defendants acted was not the complainant's bid; . . . that the proposal
read at the meeting of the board was one which the complainant never
intended to make, and that the minds of the parties never met on a
contract based thereon'."
The same rationale was adopted by W. F. Martens & Co. v. City of Syracuse, 183 App. Div. 622, 171 N. Y. S. 87 (1918).
12Donaldson v. Abraham, 68 Wash. 208, 122 P. 1003 (1912).
210 Md. 518, 531, 124 A. 2d 557 (1956).
"41 F. Supp. 369 (D. C. Conn., 1941).
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"The proper effect of the requirement that bids remain unrevoked is to assure the State that a bidder
will be relieved of his obligation only when it is legally
justifiable. That means the State is in the same posi-

tion as any acceptor
when there is a question of rectify'15
ing an error.
The "requirement" mentioned in the McGraw case was not,
however, a statutory requirement because there seemed

to have been no statute involved, but only a simple contractual proviso. One of the conditions of bidding was that
no bidder could withdraw his bid within forty-five days
after the bids were opened, and it is to this proviso the
statement refers, not to any statutory provisions. Yet the
Maryland Court stated:
"... we agree with the views of the Court in the
McGraw case, from which we have quoted above, that
the proper effects of the charter requirements are
to assure the municipality that a bidder will be relieved . .. only when it is legally justifiable. .... 1
The question arises as to whether the Court in the DeLuca
case was interpreting the legislative intent of the Charter
and basing its decision on that intent, or was holding that
regardless of the legislative intent, it will enforce the
charter provisions only when there are not present in17 the
If
picture adequate equitable grounds for rescission?
this latter view be adopted, it would appear that the Court
lIbtd, 374, quoted by the DeLuca-Davis case, 8upra, n. 13, 532.
Supra,n. 13, 535.
17It may be appropriate here to review the three possible theories which
have appeared in the instant case and which operate to exempt the bidder
from the charter provisions which might otherwise operate against him.
The first rationale is that no real bid exists in fact. Hence the statutory
provisions relating to bids are not applicable. Secondly, there is the theory
that equity has the power to relieve against statutory forfeitures. Thirdly,
there is the "legislative intent" approach where the court may presume
that the legislative intent is to exclude from the province of the charter
provisions fact situations in which there is legally justifiable error. Not
in the instant case, but advanced in Abner M. Harper v. City of Newburgh,
159 App. Div. 695, 145 N. Y. S. 59, 63 (1913), is a fourth type of reasoning:
"But if the court decide that there should be rescission, then there is no
legal obligation upon the plaintiff to contract, and it would seem inequitable
that the defendant should have liquidated damages for breach of an extinct
obligation." A paraphrase of this argument might 'be: The statutory provisions requiring forfeiture of deposit are provisions requiring liquidated
damages for breach of a legal obligation, but if a court of equity declares
that no legal obligation exists, how can there be a breach so as to justify
the forefeiture of the deposit? This is a nice argument, but it might be
considered as arguing in a circle, because the ultimate thing to be decided
is whether or not equity should grant rescission.
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is asserting18 the power of equity to relieve from a statutory
forfeiture.
There is another element in this case that may have influenced its course. The bidding contractor had a net worth
of only $82,000, so that it appeared reasonably certain that
it would be impossible for it to enter into the contract if
its bid was accepted. Section 38 requires that the City
Board of Estimates accept the bid of the "lowest responsible
bidder". 9 At the time of decision no bid had yet been
accepted, and there was extreme doubt that plaintiff contractor could qualify as a "responsible" bidder because of
its inability to secure a performance bond. The Court
recognized this factor with the statement:
"If the Board of Estimates intends to declare
DeLuca-Davis not a responsible bidder, no harm is
done by a decree rescinding the contract and calling
for the return of the deposit. Both of these consequences would follow a determination by the Board
that DeLuca-Davis was not responsible. Whether the
Board itself throws out DeLuca-Davis' bid or the court
does so, the Board can reject all bids and re-advertise,
or award the bid to the next lowest bidder who is
responsible."2 0
Let us now turn briefly to the second aspect of this case,
i.e., the Court's choice of restitution by rescission as the
proper mode of relief instead of the right of reformation
granted by the lower court. The Court of Appeals states:
"... that a court will never in the name of reformation rewrite a contract or make a contract for the par18The great weight of authority is against this position. See Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 457 (1883), where the Supreme Court said:
"Accordingly, where any penalty or forfeiture is imposed by statute
upon the doing or omission of a certain act, there courts of equity will
not interfere to mitigate the penalty of forfeiture, if incurred, for it
would be in contravention of the direct expression of the legislative
will."
See 2 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th Ed., 1941), 311, Sec. 458; 30
C. J. S. Equity, 394, Sec. 56; 19 AM. JuR., Equity, 107, Sec. 99, all in accord.
There are, however, a handful of cases contra. See Wheeling & E. G. R.
Co. v. Town of Triadelphia, 58 W. Va. 487, 52 S. E. 499 (1905) ; Caine v.
Powell, 185 Ore. 322, 202 P. 2d 931 (1949) ; Loe v. Klein, 191 Ore. 654, 233
P. 2d 209 (1951) ; Thomas v. Given, 75 Ariz. 68, 251 P. 2d 887 (1952).
iS Sec. 38 of the Charter of Baltimore City
(Flack, 1949), provides:
"All bids made to the City for supplies or work for any purpose whatever, unless otherwise provided in the Charter, shall be opened by the
Board of Estimates, and said Board, after opening said bids, shall
award the contract as an entirety to the lowest responsible bidder, ..
or shall reject all bids; . .
20 Supra, n. 13, 536.
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ties or act unless there is clear, convincing and satisfying proof of a mutual understanding and bargain that
has not been accurately expressed." 1
The nature of the unilateral mistake in the instant case
prevented that original "meeting of the minds" which is
essential in all cases where equity can decree reformation.
The Court therefore adopts the remedy of rescission.2 2 This

choice seems particularly appropriate here, because a right
of reformation, if granted after all the bids have been
opened, would violate the conditions of secrecy which are
intended to surround the submission of all such sealed competitive bids. It would seem unfair to the next lowest bidder to reform this bid after knowledge of the contents of the
other bids. The Court stated very aptly:
"To permit to be done what the appellee seeks to
do, would not only run entirely counter to the underlying principle of reformation, which is merely to correct a mistake in the expression of what had been
mutually agreed upon, but would also completely
nullify the purpose and safeguards of the competitive
bidding system established by the City Charter."23
This case presents the solution to one question that had
been previously left unanswered, but typically in the traditional manner of the common law process, it poses a new
one to take its place. It establishes that equity will rescind
the bid and return the deposit to a bidder on a municipal
project who has made a legally excusable mistake in his
bid, even in the face of the provisions of Section 38 of the
Baltimore City Charter. It poses and leaves unanswered
the question as to whether in so doing it has held, in effect,
that in Maryland, equity has the power to relieve against
statutory forfeitures.
P. McEvoy CROMWELL
-Ibid, 524.
At p. 526, the Court notes:
"Although reformation requires that the mistake be mutual, rescission may be granted whether the mistake be that of one or both of the
parties."
And at p. 527, the Court added:
"The general rule as to the conditions precedent to rescission for
unilateral mistake may be summarized thus: 1, the mistake must be
of such grave consequences that to enforce the contract as made or
offered would be unconscionable; 2, the mistake must relate to a material feature of the contract; 3, the mistake must not have come about
because of a violation of a positive legal duty or from culpable negligence; 4, the other party must be put in 8tatu8 quo to the extent that
he suffers no serious prejudice except the loss of his bargain."
Supra, n. 13, 525.

